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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of a MAS framework for dynamic ag-
gregation of population health data for research purposes. The con-
tribution of the paper is twofold: First, it describes a MAS architec-
ture that allows one to built on the fly anonymized databases from
the distributed sources of data. Second, it shows how to improve
the utility of the data with the growth of the database.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Keywords
Dynamic Data Aggregation, Cooperative Agents, Privacy, Anonymiza-
tion, TuCSoN
1. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of certain diseases, such as cancer, HIV, or other
serious medical conditions, relies on a regular administration of
critical drugs that are necessary to keep those life-threatening dis-
eases under control. Those drugs (e.g. Efavirenzum, Gentamicin,
Imatinib, Tacrolimus, Tobramycin) have a narrow therapeutic range
and a poorly predictable relationship between the dose and the drug
concentration in the blood, which may greatly vary among individ-
uals.
Therapeutic Drug Monitoring (TDM) aims to tackle this prob-
lem by monitoring drug levels in the blood and adjust the dosage
individually. TDM employs mathematical models that are based
on the analysis of the population healthcare data. These models
are developed by pharmacologists and allow one to compute char-
acteristics (pharmacokinetic parameters) of the drug based on the
patient’ covariates and, therefore, to make a personalized recom-
mendations of the drug dosage for the optimal treatment. In order
to create, evaluate, and enhance the models the population health
data are needed.
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Both the structure and the representation of the health data that
need to be aggregated for the research purposes depend on the re-
quirements for a particular study. Therefore, it is not possible to
specify a unique static schema of the research database (RSDB) for
different types of clinical research. Only in TDM data requirements
significantly vary for different drugs. For instance, in order to study
the pharmacokinetics of Gentamicin in neonates, gestational age
and postnatal age of the patients has to be specified in weeks and
days correspondingly [8]. However, conducting research in adult
population does not require such detailed data. Hence, the same
data representation will be not only inconvenient but also will com-
plicate the modeling. Therefore, it is not feasible to build one cen-
tralized RSDB that will fit the requirements of different studies that
involve medical data.
Datasets containing health related information about an individ-
ual are increasingly becoming “open”. However, if one aims at
building a publicly available centralized database that contains pa-
tients’ data and tries to keep them as detailed as possible, patients’
privacy may be violated. For example, insurance companies may
infer that a person is suffering from a chronic disease and may be
willing to refuse an application or reject the renewal of the policy.
An employer may try to infer healthcare data of potential employ-
ees and based on the information (e.g., a serious health condition or
a chronic disease susceptibility) and may discriminate a candidate
based on his or her sensitive data. Therefore, in case of medical
data aggregation the data have to be de-identified such that the re-
identification of an individual is impossible.
Building a dynamic and privacy-preserving mechanism for health-
care data aggregation in a distributed environment is of a high im-
portance. Mainly because it would allow one to collect statistically
significant amount of data in a shorter period, since several sources
of data are available. However, one has to take into account that ag-
gregation of the data even from the locally anonymized databases
can reveal sensitive information about the patient (e.g., in case of a
composition attack first described in [2]).
Several models in the area of distributed privacy-preserving data
publishing have already been proposed (i.e., pseudonymization [7,
20], secure multi-party computations (SMC) [4], microaggregation
[17], cloning [2]). However, those models significantly affect the
utility of the data, since they do not take into account certain re-
quirements regarding the use of RSDB: such as data structure and
data representation.
The novelty of our work stands on using aMAS system for defin-
ing a dynamic mechanism for privacy-preserving data aggregation
from multiple sources with a possibility to improve data utility
with the database growth. We employ multi-agent coordination and
the publish/subscribe paradigm to find potential contributors and to
achieve an agreement on the characteristics of RSDB. This is done
taking into account the data requirements specified by the study,
the data that are currently available, and the privacy guarantees.
With the growth of RSDB we are able to maximize the utility by
performing de-generalization in the distributed environment. For
this we employ the properties of the functional encryption scheme
proposed in [1] that allows to decrypt only a result of a function
applied to the encrypted data.
The advantages of using our approach are the following:
• Participation in data collection is based on the similarities of
the data that the agents possess. Therefore, the organization
of peer-to-peer (P2P) network of the potential contributors is
efficient.
• The characteristics of the database can be defined with re-
spect to a particular research question and current states of
the contributors - local databases, LDBs. Therefore, it maxi-
mizes the utility of the data.
• More fine-grained (less anonymized) data can be collected in
a shorter period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the existing models and schemes that we employ in our
framework and compare our approach with the models proposed in
the related work. Section 3 presents the architecture of the MAS,
data structure, P2P network organization and coordination between
agents. In Section 4, we define the problem of de-generalization
of the data stored in RSDB and present a solution for the one-step
de-generalization problem. We conclude and list the directions of
our future work in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we provide the background knowledge about ex-
isting models and algorithms that we use for building our MAS
framework. We describe the publish/subscribe paradigm and TuC-
SoN [14] - the models that are used for the coordination in the
distributed environment. We also describe privacy model that we
apply for aggregating the data in RSDBs, as well as the properties
of the cryptographic algorithms that we use to improve the utility
of RSDBs in a privacy preserving way. In the Subsection 2.4 we
present an overview of the related work and specify how the exist-
ing models differ from our approach.
2.1 Coordination Models
In this paper, we assume two types of coordination: the first is
publish / subscribe – to search for and publish information about
the data held in various clinical systems and to organize a P2P net-
work, the second one is TuCSoN [14] – a coordination model for
negotiation and data exchange. The publish/subscribe paradigm al-
lows one to deliver the data from their producers (publishers) to
their consumers (subscribers) in the distributed environment in the
decoupled fashion [11]. This means that publishers can introduce
the data into the system (publish/subscribe broker) being unaware
of the subscribers. Subscribers can register their interests by sub-
scriptions which act as queries or filters and are used to deliver
relevant events to the subscribers. The context publish/subscribe
broker enables publication of context information by publishers, so
that the information becomes available to subscribers which are in-
terested in processing the information provided by publishers.
Interaction between agents within TuCSoN coordination model
is happening through the tuple spaces that can be seen as a shared
system such as blackboard system [9]. Using the tuple center an
agent can insert (out operation), read (rd operation) and consume
(in operation) the tuples. The templates of the tuples need to be
specified with respect to their structure, or the ontology model needs
to be employed to interpret the information transferred by the tu-
ples. In order to establish interaction between agents the coordi-
nation rules can be set up. ReSpecT [5] – the first-order logic lan-
guage – allows one to define the behavior of the tuple centers. The
reaction rules syntax is defined as follows:
reaction (action, conditions, react) ,
where action is an operation that was performed at the tuple cen-
ter, conditions – are the conditions that need to be verified be-
fore the execution of react, that describes the events caused by the
action if the conditions were satisfied.
2.2 Anonymity of Medical Data
A variety of privacy models, (e.g., k  anonymity, (km) 
anonymity, l  diversity, e–differential privacy, etc. [10]) can be
used for privacy preserving data publishing. However, Poulis et al.
show that all these methods are not appropriate for the anonymiza-
tion of the datasets containing both relational (i.e., single-valued)
and transaction (i.e., set-valued) attributes, such as medical datasets
that contain patient demographics and diagnosis information to-
gether [15].
(k,km) anonymity proposed in [15] ensures that for any record
r in the dataset and any set of m or less items in transaction at-
tribute of r, there should be at least (k  1) records that are indis-
tinguishable from record r. However, k  anonymity for relational
attributes (i.e., existence of at least (k  1) records that are indis-
tinguishable from record r with respect to relational attributes of
the record r) and (km) anonymity for transaction attribute do not
imply (k,km) anonymity. Poulis et al. developed two frameworks
that produce (k,km)  anonymous datasets with bounded informa-
tion loss in one attribute type (relational or transaction) and mini-
mal information loss in the other (transaction or relational).
In this paper we focus on the anonymity of single valued at-
tributes, k  anonymity, to simplify the description of our MAS
system. However, our system supports (k,km)  anonymity by de-
sign.
2.3 Functional Encryption and Secret Shar-
ing Scheme
Functional encryption is a new paradigm in public-key cryptog-
raphy. It gives users more control of the amount of information
that is revealed by a ciphertext to a given receiver [1]. It allows the
receiver to decrypt only a result of the function (e.g., sum) applied
to the encrypted data without having access to the parameters of
the function (e.g., the terms of the resulting summation). The func-
tionality of this approach is based on the homomorphic properties
of the ElGamal scheme [1] that allows to sum up encrypted values
by multiplying corresponding ciphertexts.
Shamir secret sharing scheme allows to divide data D into n
pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructible from any k
pieces, but even complete knowledge of (k  1) pieces reveals ab-
solutely no information about D [16]. The scheme is based on
polynomial’ interpolation and provides the following guarantees:
(1) knowledge of any k or more pieces makes D easily computable;
(2) knowledge of any k  1 or fewer pieces leaves D completely
undetermined. This is called (k,n) threshold scheme. In our MAS
we will use the scheme where k= n, meaning that if the secret D is
divided into n pieces, all the pieces (n) are required to reconstruct
D.
2.4 Related Work
Urovi et al. in [19, 18] proposed a secure mechanism for EHR
exchange over a P2P agent based coordination framework. In this
approach the encrypted heterogeneous data are exposed over a P2P
network. The authors provide the algorithms for searching and for
publishing the EHRs in the untrusted P2P network without compro-
mising the privacy, integrity and the authenticity of the shared data.
This work, however, does not cover the aggregation of the data for
the research purposes, as we propose here.
MOSAIC [3] is a protocol for clinical data exchange with multi-
lateral agreement. It provides a way of exchanging clinical records
for the purpose of conducting medical research. MOSAIC allows
clinicians to search for specific cases in the other sources and com-
pare with the other cases that they already have. However, it does
not allow one to build a shared research database with respect to
the particular requirements since this approach does not consider
the data structure and data representation. Moreover, the patients’
privacy is not taken into account in the design of the protocol.
Elger et al. [7] present strategies for medical data exchange. The
authors give an overview of technical, practical, legal, and ethi-
cal aspects of secondary data use and discusses their implemen-
tation in the multi-institutional @neurIST research project. The
pseudonymization approach and a hight-level hybrid access-control
system that partially address privacy issues are presented in this
paper. The authors also list security vulnerabilities, including the
possibility of cracking the proposed pseudonym generation mech-
anism, dependence on a trusted third party and the possibility of
establishing an indirect identification. However, they do not pro-
vide any solutions to these problems.
An approach for continuous privacy preserving publishing of
data stream is presented in [21]. The authors use R-trees, and allow
publishing the data into the research database only after perform-
ing microaggregation locally. Similar to another approach based
on two-phase microaggregation proposed in [17] the authors do not
present any algorithm that allow the sources of data (medical insti-
tutions) to negotiate and find the agreement on the characteristics
of the research database (including anonymity parameters).
3. COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENTS
In this section we present our MAS architecture and the function-
alities of its components. We describe the structure of the data that
are stored in the databases: LDB that is the local knowledge and the
resources of an agent, and RSDB – one of the multiple anonymized
databases constructed for the research purposes. We also present
the structure of the metadata that are used during the processes of
P2P network organization and agents negotiation.
3.1 MAS Architecture
The architecture shown on the Figure 1 presents a network with
two types of nodes. The first type is an agent that is either inter-
ested in data aggregation or is able to share the data for the research
purposes. The second type - is a node that stores the metadata of
the existing RSDB. The nodes are connected in the P2P network
based on a publish/subscribe paradigm. Subscription rules indicate
what type of data the node is interested in or will be willing to pro-
vide. When the construction of RSDB starts the metadata of RSDB
is published so that the nodes (including the ones that join the net-
work later on) with corresponding subscription rules would be able
to access and populate the RSDB based on its metadata.
The knowledge of an agent is represented by a local database,
LDB (database located in a medical institution), and its metadata.
Figure 1: Architecture of the multi-agent system
An agent can use the functionalities of the following modules: Cryp-
tographic Module, Anonymization Module and De-generalization
module.
The functionalities of the Cryptographic Module are the follow-
ing: first, to create pseudonyms with which the data about the pa-
tient will be uploaded to RSDB; second, to perform functional en-
cryption and to take part in secret sharing scheme; and, third, to
generate the signature before data transfer in order to ensure the
authenticity and integrity of the data. Anonymization Module is
a realization of the medical data anony-mization that includes the
generalizaion step. The functionalities of the modules are described
in details in our previous work[6]. De - generalization Module is
used to improve the utility of the data with the growth of RSDB. Its
description is presented further in the paper, in Section 4.
The following mechanisms are available to the agents: Query /
Exchange Data and Negotiate. Query mechanism is used to query
the subscription rules as well as the metadata of RSDB. Exchange
Data mechanism is used to transfer the data to the research database
and for the metadata exchange. Negotiation is based on the TuC-
SoN coordination model [14] and aims at adjusting the charac-
teristics of RSDB (e.g., the scheme of the database, statistically
significant number of records to be collected, anonymity parame-
ters). In addition, semantic agreement between schema of different
databases and different representations of the data that are stored
in LDB needs to be established. Ontologies and existing schema
matching solutions [12, 13] can be employed during the negotia-
tion phase.
3.2 Data Structure
Local Database, LDB, stores healthcare data about the patients
that receive treatment from the particular caregiver or in a certain
medical institution. In particular, it contains Pseudonym(s), QIDN,
and Healthcare data.
Pseudonym(s) – a set of uniquely identifiable patient data, IDP,
(such as combination of date of birth, place of birth and the name)
that are stored in an encrypted form. Pseudonyms are used in order
to recontact the patient if needed. It is only possible for the doctor
Figure 2: Example of a representation of single valued QID: age and gender
using binary trees
that uploaded the data, or according to the access control policy
specified by the patient.
QIDN – quasi-identifiers – a set of the attributes ({qidn}) that in
combination can uniquely identify the person (e.g., single-valued
qidn, such as age, gender, address (i.e., ZIP code) and set-valued
qidn, such as diagnosis codes). Therefore, QIDN can not be sent
to RSDB as they are, they need to be generalized (i.e., the value
needs to be substituted by a range, the set – by a set with higher
cardinality). gnrlQIDN – a combination of generalized qidn (in a
form of a binary string), with which the data about patient P are to
be uploaded to the RSDB.
In order to represent the way of generalization the binary trees
are used. An example of such trees is shown on Figure 2. Each
node corresponds to the range (if the attribute is numerical) or to
the value generalized up to a certain degree (if the attribute is cat-
egorical). Every node is coded as a binary string depending on
the depth of the node. The structure of a thee is defined according
to the particular study an requires a knowledge of an expert from
the corresponding field. The description of a tree could be stored
in an XML-file, or as comma-separated values, or using JSON1 -
lightweight easily readable data-interchange format.
Healthcare data – drug intakes (time, dosage, drug name), char-
acteristics of the drug (absorption, clearance), co-medications, co-
variates (weight, age), concentration measurements (time, measure-
ment) – multiple attributes, that can be set-, or single-valued).
The metadata of LDB consists of the following information: KW
– a set of the keywords that describe the content of the database
(e.g., can contain the name of the drug or the diseases which the
data from the database are related to), RANGEN – is a set of in-
tervals, where each interval, rangeqidn , refers to the range of the
values corresponding to a certain attribute, qidn. Nrec – is a number
of records stored in the database. Nrec can be dynamically updated
with respect to KW. The metadata of LDB plays an important role
in the functionality of the whole framework, first, as the metadata
are used to make a decision what data will be shared and aggre-
gated. Second, as the metadata are used in negotiation phase to
adjust the characteristics of the RSDB.
RSDB can be seen as a combination of the data aggregated from
different LDBs and anonymized on the fly. As LDB, RSDB also
contains Pseudonyms and Healthcare data. However, instead of
QIDN, RSDB stores their generalized versions, gnrlQIDN, because
publishing QIDN as they are may result in re-identification of the
patient, thus violation of patient’ privacy.
StRSDB–is a database that stores the metadata of RSDB, and
are constantly updating to reflect the current state of RSDB dur-
ing the process of RSDB construction. For each combination of
gnrlQIDNr ,8r 2 1,S2 that are presented in RSDB, StRSDB stores
the following information: PsNumber — a number of different
1http://json.org
2S-is a number of different combinations of gnrlQIDN
Figure 3: An example of one-step de-generalizarion: part of RSDB (a),
database that represents the state of the RSDB before (b) and after (d) one-
step de-generalization, selected nodes from the generalization tree (c).
pseudonyms from RSDB associated with the same gnrlQIDNr and
an array that shows the source of data, in particular: Ci, identity
of the caregiver that uploaded the data, and PsNumberi, a number
that shows how many pseudonyms associated with this gnrlQIDNj
have been uploaded by Ci. One has to notice that as RSDB is k 
anonymous, PsNumber   k and Âi21,T PsNumberi = PsNumber.
Figure 3(b) presents an example of StRSDB.
3.3 P2P Network Organization
We assume that medical institutions will be willing to collabo-
rate and share the data based on the following reasons. First, they
could be interested in aggregation of data similar to the data they
possess in order to obtain statistically significant number of cases
for their own research purposes. Second, we can also assume that
they would provide the data without looking for a certain profit but
aiming at patient care improvement in general by providing the data
for the research.
Publish/subscribe approach is used in our framework in order to
create a P2P network of nodes that are interested to create, to pop-
ulate or to use particular RSDB with certain requirements. We con-
sider the following actors: Data Publisher, Subscriber, and Meta-
data Publisher. Data Publisher – is an agent that possesses certain
data and is interested in their sharing and, potentially, using RSDB.
Subscriber – is an agent that is interested in obtaining a database
for the particular research. If there is no suitable database already
built, the Subscriber can initiate the process of the data aggrega-
tion. When the process starts the Subscriber creates another node -
Metadata Publisher. It will host the research database (RSDB) and
its metadata providing the information about RSDB to the network
even if the Subscriber that initiated data aggregation leaves the net-
work. Every subscription contains a part of metadata of LDB such
as keywords (KW), and, possibly, the ranges of certain attributes
that represent the data stored in the LDB.
Publisher initiates the process by sending the initial description
of the RSDB such that the mediator – context publish-subscribe
broker – can simply match the requirements with the data provided
by publishers (Data Publishers and Metadata Publishers). If there
is no suitable RSDB found the data aggregation process starts from
organizing the network of potential contributors of the data based
on the data provided by Data Publishers. Detailed definition of the
publish-subscribe rules and their implementation are the focus of
our future work.
3.4 Negotiation between Agents
We assume that P2P network is organized when the nodes from
Data Publishers are selected and they start communicating with the
Subscriber that initiated the process of data aggregation. Differ-
ent types of interactions that occur between agents while building
RSDB can be split into the following groups depending of the aim
of the interaction: establishing sources of the data, adjusting pa-
rameters of RSDB (RSDB schema, anonymity parameters, general-
ization trees), and updating RSDB (by populating it with the new
records or updating with the de-generalized ones).
First, we assume that the agent (further, initiator) that is inter-
ested in data aggregation starts interaction with the potential con-
tributors trough the tuple centers by specifying more concrete re-
quirement for RSDB. In order to establish the sources of the data it
will start communication with the agents identified at the previous
step by writing the tuple t1:
t1 = {KW(RSDB),{rangeqidn(RSDB)},Nrec(RSDB)}.
The agent receiving the information will act according to the fol-
lowing rule:
reaction (out(t1), condition_1, out_r(t2));
condition_1: KW(RSDB)⇢ KW(LDB), rangeqidn(RSDB)⇢
⇢ rangeqidn(LDB), n2 1,N, Nrec(RSDB)⇢Nrec(LDB)3.
t2 = {KW(LDB),{rangeqidn(LDB)},Nrec(LDB)}.
where condition_1 verifies whether the agent, that received the
message, possesses the data required and is ready to contribute to
RSDB. If the verification is successful, the agent (further, contribu-
tor) shares its LDB’ metadata.
Hereafter we show the description of the rules for the initiator
and contributor, as well as the structure of the tuples and the condi-
tions.
t1 = {KW(RSDB),{rangeqidn(RSDB)},Nrec(RSDB)},
t2 = {KW(LDB), {rangeqidn(LDB)}, Nrec(LDB)},
t3 = {{qidn(RSDB),TreeURLqidn}, k},
t4 = {qidn(RSDB), node, rangenode, k},
t5 = {k,StRSDBURL}, {qidn(RSDB),TreeURLqidn}},
t6 = {PS,gnrlQIDN, Healthcaredata}.
condition_1: KW(RSDB)⇢ KW(LDB), rangeqidn (RSDB)⇢
⇢ rangeqidn (LDB), n2 1,N, Nrec(RSDB)⇢Nrec(LDB).
% initiator:
reaction (out(t2), in(t2), out(t3));
reaction (out(t4),((in(t4))^(agreement is archived)),
out(t5));
reaction (out(t6), in(t6), ((update RSDB)^
^(update StRSDB)).
% contributor:
reaction (out(t1), condition_1, out(t2));
reaction (out(t3), ((in(t3))^(agreement is not achieved)),
out(t4));
reaction (out(t5), ((in(t5))^(data are anonymized
according to t5)),out(t6)).
After writing the initial requirements the initiator will read and
aggregate the information carried out by tuples of a type t2, that
have been received from different contributors. Based on the ex-
pert knowledge and data provided by other agents initiator will
construct the initial version of the generalization binary trees for
every qidn.
3the conditions can be relaxed by verifying the intersection be-
tween the requirements for RSDB and LDB metadata and compar-
ing with the threshold (e.g., if the threshold for the intersection be-
tween the keywords is set up to be tr, than the condition for the key-
words can be modified as follows: KW(RSDB)\KW(LDB)  tr)
The next step is to achieve an agreement on the description of
the generalization binary trees that correspond to the set of QIDN.
The initiator of data collection creates an additional node in the
network to store the metadata of RSDB, anonymity parameter k,
and the files with the specification of the generalization trees. Next,
it shares these data in the network by writing the tuple t3. The
other agents in the P2P network will be able to access this node
and to suggest modifications (if any). It can be expressed by tuple
t4 by providing an alternative suggestion for the specification of the
particular nodes or the anonymity parameter k.
When the agreement of the specification of the binary trees is
reached, the initiator provides to contributors the updated general-
ization trees, the anonymity parameter k, and the link to the meta-
data of the initialized RSDB. (For the simplicity we assume that
RSDB is initialized as k  anonymous version of the LDB, which
has the maximum number of records (Nrec(LDB)) that satisfy the
requirements sent from initiator. k  anonymous version is con-
structed by applying one of the microaggregation algorithms [10]
locally.) After the initialization of RSDB all the contributors can up-
date the database with any number of records using the anonymiza-
tion algorithm presented in our previous work[6]. Insertion of the
new record in RSDBwill automatically cause the update of StRSDB.
4. IMPROVING UTILITY OF THE DATA
In this section we focus of the de-generalization problem: first,
we define one-step de-generalization and we present a coordination
mechanism to perform one-step de-generalization using coopera-
tive agents. Second, we define the de-generalization problem for
the general case.
4.1 One-step De-generalization
We define one-step de-generalization as a process of splitting
the records with the same attributes into two groups such that the
level of generalization of one of the attributes will be decreased
by one, or, in other words, the level of de-generalization will be
increased by one. (The level of de-generalization is shown bz the
depth of the node to which the initial value of the attribute had
been generalized, while the level of generalization = (height of the
tree - level of de-generalization)). For instance, according to the
binary trees shown on Figure 2 the records with the attribute age
from 25 to 50 years old coded as {01;⇤} can be de-generalized by
splitting them into the groups with more fine-grained description of
the attributes. For the example shown on Figure 3 with respect to
the age we can consider forming two groups [25-38) and [38-50)
coded as "010" and as "011" respectively, while the gender stays
generalized the same way:
{01;⇤}) {010;⇤}_{011;⇤} (1)
However, the following constrains need to be taken into account:8><>:
kp   k,8p 2 {0,1},
Â1p=0 kp = K,
(Â1p=0 a
p
t = at).
(2)
The set of inequalities (2) requires the following. First, the num-
bers of records in both groups after splitting (k0, k1) should be
greater then the parameter k required for k  anonymity. Second,
the sum of the numbers of records in both groups after splitting
should be equal to the number of records in the group before split-
ting (K). This can be guaranteed only by taking into account the
numbers of records that came from different sources (at , t 2 1,T,
where T - is a number of sources that contributed the records to the
spitted group).
The solution is straightforward if there exists a node at , such that
(a0t   k)^(a1t   k). In other words, if there exists a contributor (one
of the LDBs) that provided to RSDB a certain amount of records
(  2k) such that the de-generalization of this group of records will
result in having at least k records in both groups after splitting (first
inequality of (2) is satisfied locally). Therefore, de-generalization
of the records (with the same initial set of gnrlQIDNr ) provided by
the other agents will not violate k-anonymity property of the RSDB.
For the case when one-step de-generalization is not possible lo-
cally, we propose the following coordination mechanism for col-
laborative privacy preserving one-step de-generalization.
1. Each agent sends Enc(a0t ), Enc(a1t ),
2. The evaluation of: 
Dec
 
T
Â
t=0
Enc(a0t )
!
  k
!^ 
Dec
 
T
Â
t=0
Enc(a1t )
!
  k
!
(3)
is performed using de-generalization module (that implements
the properties of the functional encryption scheme [1]) with-
out knowing a0t and a1t .
3. If (3) is true, it is possible to improve the utility of the data
by one-step de-generalizing the records. To transmit the up-
dated values the Shamir [16] secret sharing scheme is used.
The agents will have to send one-step de-generalized val-
ues (apt , p 2 {0,1}) that are encrypted with key D, an ac-
cess to which is "blocked" until all the agents provide their
part of the secret ({Dt}). Those parts will be used to recon-
struct the key D, to decrypt de-generalized values and up-
date RSDB improving the utility of the data while maintain-
ing anonymity property of the RSDB. Therefore, preserving
privacy of the patients.
The tuples and coordination rules can be specified as follows.
t7 = {gnrlQIDN, gnrlqidn, rangegnrlqidn};
t8 = {gnrlqidn, Enc(a0), Enc(a1)};
t9 = {{PS,gnrlqid+n}, Dt}.
% initiator:
reaction (out(t8), (3) is true, out(true));
reaction (out(t9), ((in(t9))^(D is true)),
((update RSDB)^(update StRSDB))).
% contributor:
reaction (out(t7), in(t7), out(t8));
reaction (out({true}), in({true}), out(t9)).
Hereafter we analyze the possibility of the agent’s misbehav-
ior. The first case is the following: if not all agents sent the data
at the Step 1 (encrypted one-step de-generalized values), it would
only decrease a possibility to successfully evaluate (3) at the Step
2. However, it would not affect the privacy, as the data (a0t , a1t )
are encrypted. The second possibility is if not all nodes sent the
de-generalized data, then based on the properties of Shamir se-
cret sharing scheme it would not be possible to decrypt the de-
generalized data. Then as in the previous case, it is only not possi-
ble to de-generalize, but the privacy is preserved.
4.2 De-generalization Problem Definition
We want to maximize the utility of the data, which implies their
de-generalization as much as possible. This means the maximiza-
tion of two parameters. First, LN = {Ln}, n 2 1,N, or, more pre-
cisely, every component of the vector that consists of the depths
of the nodes that show the least generalized representation of the
data in RSDB. Second, the number of possible splitting between
the nodes whose depth is smaller then Ln, n 2 1,N. This will bring
us to the maximization of S+ =k gnrlQID+N k-a set of different
gnrlQID+N, that represent the de-generalized versions of the quasi-
identifiers, gnrlQIDN with which the data were upload initially.
Therefore, gnrlQID+N can only be chosen such that gnrlqidn is
a prefix of gnrlqid+n for every n 2 1,N. In addition, we also have
to take into account (k,km) anonymity requirements.
We can define the requirements and constraints described above
in the following way:8><>:
S+ ismax,
kgnrlQID+N   k,8gnrlQID+N 2 S+
ÂSj=1 kgnrlQID+Nj = kgnrlQIDN .
(4)
In practice, quasi-identifiers that will be de-generalized can be
chosen based on their importance that depends on the initial RSDB
requirements specification.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we showed how to build research databases tak-
ing into account certain requirements with respect to the purposes
of a particular research question. In addition, we provide a possi-
bility to constantly improve data utility with the databases growth
in a privacy preserving way. To achieve this, we developed an ar-
chitecture that is based on the coordination between cooperative
agents organized in a peer-to-peer network. We also presented the
advantages of using publish / subscribe paradigm and TuCSoN co-
ordination model for the aggregation of population health data for
the research purposes.
We analyzed the possible threats in the case of malicious be-
havior of the agents and showed that our approach preserves the
patients privacy while improving the utility of the data aggregated
for the research. We studied the problem of de-generalization and
presented a solution for one-step de-generalization and defined the
problem for a general case.
In the future work, we will continue working on the implemen-
tation of the MAS proposed in the paper and will evaluate our solu-
tion with a synthetic dataset and the patient data in the framework
of the NanoTera project4. We also plan to extend the proposed
model to solve the de-generalization problem in general case.
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